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Elements of a New Ethical Framework
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∗
O’Brien, and Micah Altman
Emerging large-scale data sources hold tremendous potential
for new scientific research into human biology, behaviors, and
relationships. At the same time, big data research presents privacy
and ethical challenges that the current regulatory framework is
ill-suited to address. In light of the immense value of large-scale
research data, the central question moving forward is not whether
such data should be made available for research, but rather how
the benefits can be captured in a way that respects fundamental
principles of ethics and privacy.
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In response, this Essay outlines elements of a new ethical
framework for big data research. It argues that oversight should
aim to provide universal coverage of human subjects research,
regardless of funding source, across all stages of the information
lifecycle. New definitions and standards should be developed
based on a modern understanding of privacy science and the
expectations of research subjects. In addition, researchers and
review boards should be encouraged to incorporate systematic
risk-benefit assessments and new procedural and technological
solutions from the wide range of interventions that are available.
Finally, oversight mechanisms and the safeguards implemented
should be tailored to the intended uses, benefits, threats, harms,
and vulnerabilities associated with a specific research activity.
Development of a new ethical framework with these elements
should be the product of a dynamic multistakeholder process that
is designed to capture the latest scientific understanding of
privacy, analytical methods, available safeguards, community
and social norms, and best practices for research ethics as they
evolve over time. Such a framework would support big data
utilization and help harness the value of big data in a sustainable
and trust-building manner.
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I. Introduction1
Vast quantities of data about individuals are increasingly
being created by new services such as mobile apps and through
methods such as DNA sequencing.2 These data sources can be
quite rich, containing large numbers of fine-grained data points
related to human biology, behaviors, and relationships over time.3
Because they can enable analyses at an unprecedented level of
detail, these large-scale data sources hold tremendous potential
for scientific inquiry. In addition, the costs of obtaining, storing,
and analyzing data from these sources are low and continuing to
1. This Essay summarizes, in part, joint work with other collaborators.
Jeffrey P. Kahn, Effy Vayena & Anna C. Mastroianni, Learning As We Go:
Lessons from the Publication of Facebook’s Social-Computing Research, 111
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 13677 (2014); Micah Altman,
Alexandra Wood, David R. O’Brien, Salil Vadhan & Urs Gasser, Towards a
Modern Approach to Privacy-Aware Government Data Releases, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016); Salil Vadhan et al., Comments to the
Department of Health and Human Services Re: Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, Docket No. HHS-OPHS-2011-0005 (Oct. 26, 2011), archived at
https://perma.cc/CK7V-V4AT; Effy Vayena, Marcel Salathé, Lawrence C. Madoff
& John S. Brownstein, Ethical Challenges of Big Data in Public Health, 11
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY e1003904 (2015); David R. O’Brien et al.,
Integrating Approaches to Privacy Across the Research Lifecycle: When Is
Information Purely Public?, Berkman Ctr. Res. Pub. No. 2015-7 (2015),
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/16140637; Alexandra Wood et al., Comments
to the Department of Health and Human Services Re: Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects; Proposed Rules, Docket No. HHS–OPHS–2015–
0008 (Jan. 6, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/6JHM-X7YJ.
2. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, at ix
(2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf (describing how the “ubiquity of
computing and electronic communication technologies has led to the exponential
growth of data from both digital and analog sources”).
3. See id. § 2.1, at 11–13 (providing examples of the types of data collected
from new big data sources).
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fall, relative to the costs of conducting traditional research
studies.
For these reasons, big data are driving rapid advances in
research, particularly through the emergence of fields such as
computational social science and biomedical big data research.4
Public health researchers, for example, are currently exploring
ways to supplement traditional methods of disease outbreak
detection by analyzing streams of data from social networks, chat
rooms, and web search queries.5 Looking ahead, interest in the
research potential of big data is expected to continue to rise as
the number of large-scale data sources increases and the
technological capabilities for big data analysis improve.
We recognize the immense research value of big data and
believe new large-scale data sources should be made available so
that their full potential can be realized. At the same time, big
data research presents new risks that the current regulatory
framework is ill-suited to address. In light of the substantial
value of large-scale data, the central question moving forward is
not whether such data should be made available for research, but
rather how the benefits can be captured in a way that respects
fundamental principles of ethics and privacy. This Essay
therefore recommends updates to the oversight framework that
would help enable the collection, use, and sharing of big data in
4. See David Lazer et al., Life in the Network: The Coming Age of
Computational Social Science, 323 SCIENCE 721, 721 (2009) (describing the
adoption of computational social science methods by Internet companies, such
as Google and Yahoo, and government agencies, like the U.S. National Security
Agency); Gary King, Ensuring the Data Rich Future of the Social Sciences, 331
SCIENCE 719, 719–20 (2011) (providing an overview of how “[m]assive increases
in the availability of informative social science data are making dramatic
progress possible in analyzing, understanding, and addressing many major
societal problems”); Eric Bender, Big Data in Biomedicine, 527 NATURE S1, S1
(2015) (providing a short update on developments in the use of big data in the
field of biomedicine).
5. See Vayena et al., supra note 1, at 3 (discussing how big data sources
are utilized in digital disease detection); see also, e.g., Amy Wesolowski et al.,
Quantifying the Impact of Human Mobility on Malaria, 338 SCIENCE 267, 268
(2012) (describing the use of mobile phone data to track human travel and
estimate its contribution to the spread of malaria in Kenya); David Talbot,
African Bus Routes Redrawn Using Cell-Phone Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 30,
2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/514211/african-bus-routes-redrawnusing-cell-phone-data/ (reporting on the use of mobile phone data to optimize an
urban transportation system in Ivory Coast).
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line with ethical principles, research community norms, and the
expectations of human subjects. Achieving this balance will be
critical to ensuring the trust and support of the public and,
ultimately, the long-term viability of big data research.
II. Recent Illustrations of Oversight Issues in Big Data Research
There have recently been a number of high-profile incidents
illustrating gaps in the oversight of big data research. Most
notably, researchers involved in a joint Facebook-Cornell
University study generated controversy in 2014 when they
published the results of empirical research involving
interventions with Facebook users without their knowledge.6 The
study aimed to observe changes in behavior and mood in response
to variations in emotionally charged content viewed by users of
the Facebook social media platform. These types of interventions
almost certainly would have required approval from an
institutional review board (IRB) had the research been conducted
under a federal grant, rather than in a commercial setting.7 This
is just one example of the types of research activities increasingly
conducted beyond the reach of traditional oversight due to the
limited scope of the regulations in place.8
Potential oversight gaps have been discovered not only in
study design and data collection but also in data release. In 2008,
researchers published findings on a methodology for determining
whether data about a specific individual are contained in a
database including mixtures of genomic DNA collected from
hundreds of people.9 Although some believed the genomic DNA
6. Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock,
Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social
Networks, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. 8788 (2014).
7. For a detailed discussion of the applicability of the Common Rule to the
emotional contagion experiment and social media studies more generally, see
James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media
Users, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 219 (2015).
8. See generally id. (discussing the current regulatory framework and
recommending changes in light of big data research activities).
9. See Nils Homer et al., Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace
Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex Mixtures Using High-Density SNP
Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PLOS GENETICS e1000167 (2008).
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databases to be sufficiently aggregated so as to pose little risk to
individual privacy, a group of researchers showed that an
individual’s participation in a study about a specific medical
condition could potentially be confirmed using the released data.
The National Institutes of Health revoked public access to two
DNA databases as a result of this study, and other organizations
that maintain similar databases are following suit.10 In another
study, researchers even demonstrated the potential to infer the
surnames of individuals in de-identified genomic databases.11
More generally, privacy is a significant challenge for largescale datasets, as the number of data points associated with a
given record makes it highly likely for it to be unique and,
therefore, identifiable.12 Techniques for learning about
individuals in a data release are rapidly advancing, enabling new
scientific discoveries but also exposing vulnerabilities in many
commonly used measures for protecting privacy. These
vulnerabilities are calling into question regulatory approaches
that broadly permit the public release of aggregated or deidentified data without the use of additional controls.
III. Gaps in the Scope of the Existing Regulatory Framework
Human subjects research protection frameworks developed
in the late 1970s fail to address many of the oversight challenges
in big data research. Broadly speaking, social, behavioral, and
10. See Jason Felch, DNA Profiles Blocked from Public Access, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/29/local/me-dna29 (reporting
on revocations of public access to DNA databases due to privacy concerns).
11. See Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname
Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321 (2013).
12. See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall:
On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata, 347 SCIENCE 536, 536 (2015)
(demonstrating that knowing the dates and locations of four purchases is
sufficient to identify 90% of the people in a dataset of credit card transactions
that has been stripped of information typically considered to be personally
identifying); see generally Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the
Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility, 3 NATURE SCI. REPS. (2013),
http://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376 (finding that “in a dataset where the
location of an individual is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal
to that given by the carrier's antennas, four spatio-temporal points are enough
to uniquely identify 95% of the individuals”).
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educational researchers have argued that the current regulatory
framework emphasizes practices, such as obtaining informed
consent and balancing the benefits of research against the risks
of participation, that are out of place in non-clinical research.13
These gaps are especially pronounced with respect to many types
of big data research.14 For example, when using data originally
collected by a third party such as Facebook, a researcher has not
interacted with the subjects of the data and informed them of the
risks associated with their participation. Furthermore,
regulations currently emphasize risk mitigation at the study
design and data collection stages of the information lifecycle and,
to a much lesser extent, those that arise in later stages, such as
the transformation, dissemination, and post-access stages.
Consequently, as advances in big data drive increased data
sharing and re-use by researchers, more of their activities will be
subject to limited or, in some cases, no oversight.
Definitions found in the federal policy for the protection of
human subjects, known as the Common Rule,15 also create gaps
in oversight. What qualifies as human subjects research—and
therefore falls within the purview of the Common Rule and IRB
review—is rather narrowly defined.16 Its scope is limited to
research involving “a living individual about whom an
investigator (whether professional or student) conducting
research obtains (1) [d]ata through intervention or interaction
with the individual, or (2) [i]dentifiable private information.”17
Many types of research conducted today using big data do not fall
13. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE COMMON
RULE: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTS: WORKSHOP
SUMMARY 10–12 (2013) (discussing critiques of the requirements of the Common
Rule as applied in social, behavioral, and educational research).
14. See Letter from the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human
Research Protections to the Health and Human Services Secretary, Sylvia M.
Burwell, Attachment A: Human Subjects Research Implications of “Big Data”
Studies (Apr. 24, 2015).
15. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 7 C.F.R. pt. 1c, 10
C.F.R. pt. 745, 14 C.F.R. pt. 1230, 15 C.F.R. pt. 27, 16 C.F.R. pt. 1028, 24 C.F.R.
pt. 60, 28 C.F.R. pt. 46, 32 C.F.R. pt. 219, 34 C.F.R. pt. 97, 38 C.F.R. pt. 16, 40
C.F.R. pt. 26, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46, 45 C.F.R. pt. 690, 49 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2015).
16. For a discussion of the gaps created by the Common Rule’s definition of
human subjects research, see generally Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., supra note 1.
17. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2015).
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squarely within this definition. For example, research using a
pre-existing Facebook dataset arguably falls outside the scope of
this definition because it does not involve an intervention or
interaction between the researcher and the research subjects.18
The second part of this definition likely excludes from
oversight some research associated with non-minimal risk of
harm. For instance, it permits a researcher who conducts
secondary analysis using a de-identified dataset to apply for an
exemption from IRB review.19 De-identification alone, however,
does not minimize all privacy risks to subjects or necessarily
protect personal information in the manner that most individuals
would expect. A research dataset that has been de-identified can,
in many cases, be re-identified easily.20 For example, numerous
attacks on de-identified datasets have demonstrated that it is
often possible to identify individuals in data that have been
stripped of direct and indirect identifiers.21 It has been shown
more generally that very few pieces of information can be used to
uniquely identify an individual in a released set of data.22
As illustrated by the genomic DNA database examples
provided above, data stripped of identifiers or released in
aggregate form may nevertheless carry privacy risks.
Alternatives to traditional de-identification techniques, such as
privacy-aware methods for producing contingency tables,
synthetic data, data visualizations, interactive mechanisms, and
multiparty computations can in many cases provide strong
guarantees of privacy while also largely preserving the utility of
18. For a discussion of this definition in the context of social media
research, see Grimmelmann, supra note 7.
19. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2015) (exempting “[r]esearch involving the
collection or study of existing data . . . if the information is recorded by the
investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or
through identifiers linked to the subjects”).
20. See Arvind Narayanan & Edward W. Felten, No Silver Bullet:
De-Identification
Still
Doesn’t
Work,
at
1
(July
9,
2014),
http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/RD6U-W4X7 (arguing “there is no evidence that deidentification works either in theory or in practice”).
21. See id. (discussing numerous successful demonstrations of the potential
to identify individuals in datasets that had been deemed de-identified).
22. See sources cited supra note 12 (demonstrating that as few as two to
four data points can be sufficient to uniquely identify individuals in large-scale
datasets).
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the data.23 Rather than promoting the use of more robust
approaches such as these, however, the Common Rule arguably
encourages the wide use and sharing of data that have been deidentified using heuristic techniques and released in forms that
may be vulnerable to significant privacy risks.
The second part of the Common Rule’s definition of human
subjects research also exempts research using information
considered to be non-private. The distinction between public and
private information, however, is the subject of significant
debate.24 Sensitive information is increasingly captured in big
data scraped from the web or observed via sensors in public
spaces and used for research, often with little or no oversight.25
Although the protections of the Common Rule apply to research
using personal information that subjects have a reasonable
expectation will not be made public, many individuals have
mismatched expectations regarding secondary uses of
information deemed to be public.26 Consequently, some
23. See Salil Vadhan et al., supra note 1. Many of these advanced methods
are also compatible with a strong, formal guarantee of privacy known as
differential privacy. See generally Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for
Private Data Analysis, 54 COMMC’NS ACM 86 (2011) (defining the framework of
differential privacy).
24. For a discussion of the evolving notion of public information, see
generally David R. O’Brien et al., supra note 1.
25. See ALEX PENTLAND, SOCIAL PHYSICS: HOW GOOD IDEAS SPREAD—THE
LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 8–10 (2014) (exploring how research using big
data collected from smartphones, GPS devices, and online platforms can yield
insights into social behavior); R. Benjamin Shapiro & Pilar N. Ossorio,
Regulation of Online Social Network Studies, 339 SCIENCE 144, 144 (2013)
(describing research conducted on social networking web sites and the lack of
guidance on conducting such research ethically); Michael Zimmer, “But the Data
Is Already Public”: On the Ethics of Research in Facebook, 12 ETHICS INFO. TECH.
313, 314 (2010) (discussing ethical concerns related to research using data from
social networking web sites).
26. See Mary Madden, Privacy Management on Social Media Sites, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/24/privacymanagement-on-social-media-sites, archived at https://perma.cc/QZ29-4GAU
(finding that individuals may share personal information through social media
as a result of a lack of understanding regarding how such information is
retained and used by such services); Yabing Liu et al., Analyzing Facebook
Privacy Settings: User Expectations vs. Reality, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011 ACM
SIGCOMM CONFERENCE ON INTERNET MEASUREMENT 61, 63–65 (2011),
http://conferences.sigcomm.org/imc/2011/docs/ p61.pdf (describing the results of
an experiment highlighting the mismatch between Facebook’s privacy practices
and users’ expectations).
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commentators argue that IRBs and investigators should take
steps to protect some personal information obtained from public
sources.27 Compare, for instance, the approach taken by the
Common Rule to that found in the European Union, where many
categories of information are protected as personal data despite
their public nature.28
In response to this debate, research communities have
developed ethical guidelines, and the Secretary’s Advisory
Committee on Human Research Protections has developed draft
guidance on the use of data collected from Internet sources.29
These resources aim to address many of the challenges associated
with determining whether information collected online qualifies
as public or private under the existing regulations.30 However,
what is considered to fall within these definitions is open to
interpretation and will likely evolve over time. Further guidance
on interpreting such standards and incorporating them into
review board policies is needed.31
Another sizable subset of big data research not subject to the
Common Rule is research supported exclusively by private
funding. The sharp distinction between publicly and privately
funded research results in inconsistent oversight, as many
27. For a discussion of proposals to address the gap between subject
expectations and the use of publicly available data, see David R. O’Brien et al.,
supra note 1.
28. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) 31
(“‘[P]ersonal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).”); Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at 41,
COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) (“‘[P]ersonal data’ means any information
relating to a data subject.”).
29. ANNETTE MARKHAM & ELIZABETH BUCHANAN, ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING
AND INTERNET RESEARCH, RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE AOIR ETHICS WORKING
COMMITTEE
(2012),
http://aoir.org/reports/ethics2.pdf,
archived
at
https://perma.cc/V2TR-4UA8; Letter from Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Human Research Protections to the HHS Secretary, Attachment B:
Considerations and Recommendations Concerning Internet Research and
Human Subjects Research Regulations, with Revisions (May 20, 2013),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/commsec/attachmentbsecletter20.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/AB2P-UEC8.
30. See sources cited supra note 29.
31. See David R. O’Brien et al., supra note 1 (setting forth this proposition
in greater detail).
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privately funded research activities carry the same types of risks
as research funded by the government.32 In fact, identical studies
conducted by two different organizations, one privately funded
and another publicly funded, can be subject to markedly different
requirements. Note, however, that institutional policies are
evolving partially to address this gap. For example, many IRB
policies cover certain research projects that are not federally
funded,33 and journal policies in many cases require all authors to
undergo a formal ethical review before publication regardless of
funding source.34 A privately funded researcher may also come
under the federal rules if she collaborates with a federally funded
researcher. Furthermore, laws at the state level impose
additional requirements for human subjects research protection
that partially fill this gap.35
In addition to the various regulations and policies that apply
to different classes of researchers within the United States, the
regulations of foreign jurisdictions may also apply if any of the
collaborating researchers or research subjects are located outside
the United States. Many big data research initiatives are
international in nature, and protections vary substantially
depending on the national data protection regulation that
applies. This can lead to mismatches between the safeguards
32. For a discussion of the gap in oversight for privately funded research,
see Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., supra note 1.
33. See, e.g., Policy: Commensurate Protections for Non-Federally Funded
Human Subjects Research, UCLA OFFICE OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROT. PROGRAM,
at 2 (June 4, 2013), http://ora.research.ucla.edu/OHRPP/Documents/Policy/10/
CommensurateProtections.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/24PP-RD76 (“The
UCLA IRB applies protections equivalent to the Common Rule and Subparts A,
B, C, and D to all non-federally funded research, with the following
exceptions . . . .”).
34. See,
e.g.,
Editorial
Policies,
BIOMED
CENTRAL,
https://www.biomedcentral.com/submissions/editorial-policies (last visited Feb.
28, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/XV7V-QX3S (“Research involving human
subjects, human material, or human data, must have been performed in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and must have been approved by an
appropriate ethics committee.”).
35. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (2016) (“No human research
may be conducted in this state in the absence of the voluntary informed consent
subscribed to in writing by the human subject.”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN.
§ 13-2002(a) (West 2016) (“A person may not conduct research using a human
subject unless the person conducts the research in accordance with the federal
regulations on the protection of human subjects.”).
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used and the expectations and understanding of individual
participants. For instance, research subjects may believe that the
regulations of their home country protect their personal data,
when in fact the requirements of another jurisdiction could be
followed once their data cross a border.36 The variations in
treatment that result from the application of different regulatory
requirements and expectations of privacy across jurisdictions
creates challenges for researchers, particularly in the secondary
analysis of data, as the location of every research subject might
not be known. Furthermore, the fact that different protections
may apply as research data about a subject moves between
jurisdictions is generally not disclosed in consent forms. These
factors contribute to uncertainty among researchers and subjects
regarding which standards apply to a specific research activity,
as well as overall inconsistency in research oversight.37
IV. The Inadequacy of Informed Consent Requirements
Informed consent is a cornerstone of human subjects
research protection. An approach based solely on notice and
consent, however, has many known weaknesses. Consent forms
and terms of service are lengthy, complex, and difficult to
understand.38 Disclosures often do not inform subjects of all
potential data uses and the harms that could result from misuse
of their personal information.39 In addition, subjects generally
have limited opportunities to withhold, revoke, or modify consent.
36. For a discussion of many of the issues that may arise when collecting,
using, and sharing research data about human subjects across multiple
jurisdictions, see David R. O’Brien et al., supra note 1.
37. See Jeffrey P. Kahn, supra note 1 (discussing inconsistencies in current
oversight).
38. See, e.g., S. Michael Sharp, Consent Documents for Oncology Trials:
Does Anybody Read These Things?, 27 AM. J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 570 (2004);
Carlos Jensen & Colin Potts, Privacy Policies As Decision-Making Tools: An
Evaluation of Online Privacy Notices, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 471 (2004); Aleecia M.
McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S J.
L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 560, 561 (2008).
39. See Irene Pollach, What’s Wrong with Online Privacy Policies?, 50
COMMC’NS ACM 103, 103–08 (2007) (arguing that privacy policies tend not to
build trust but rather exacerbate privacy concerns).
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These concerns are heightened in big data research, which is
often characterized by a substantial separation between the
researcher and the research subject. For example, mobile and
social networking platforms often embed notice about data
collection and sharing practices, including the potential research
uses of data collected through the platform, in terms of service,
and individuals impliedly consent to sharing their data under
such terms through their use of the service. Because the details
are often buried in lengthy terms of service, users are likely
unaware that they are participating in human subjects research
through their use of a mobile or social networking platform
alone.40 More generally, the reliance on terms of service that are
often vague, complex, and subject to modification without notice
leaves users with an incomplete understanding of how their
personal information will be used and shared by the service.
These practices arguably fall short of the informed consent
requirements intended by research ethics and regulatory
frameworks that were developed for clinical research and the
extensive recruitment and informed consent processes
established in that context. If the research oversight framework
is to be expanded to provide coverage for new categories of big
data research, protections beyond the consent practices currently
in wide use will likely be necessary.
V. Recommendations for a New Ethical Framework for Big Data
Research
A robust oversight framework is essential to safeguarding
the interests of research subjects; ensuring trust, transparency,
and accountability in the research community; maintaining
40. See Effy Vayena, Ann Mastroianni & Jeffrey Kahn, Caught in the Web:
Informed Consent for Online Health Research, 5 SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED.
173fs6, at 2 (2013), http://stm.sciencemag.org/content/scitransmed/5/173/
173fs6.full.pdf (“[N]o publicly available studies have yet documented whether
users understand or are even aware of the potential uses of their data when
they access a site.”); Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., supra note 1, at 13678 (“Unlike in
psychology research, however, participants in social-computing studies may not
be recruited in the usual sense, and so may not even realize they are
participating in research, let alone that there may be interventions, including
manipulation or deception, involved.”).
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continued support for, funding of, and participation in research
studies; and realizing the full research potential of big data. As
demonstrated by the gaps in oversight discussed above, changes
to the existing framework are needed to continue to advance
these values in big data research. At the core of this Essay’s
recommendations is recognition of both the ethical obligation to
protect personal data41 and the human right to participation in
the production of scientific knowledge.42 A component of the
human right to science, the latter refers to the obligations of
governments and other actors, including corporations,43 to protect
and promote participation in science across all stages of the
research lifecycle.44 An intervention designed to protect human
subjects, therefore, should not prevent people who are willing to
participate in a study from doing so and thereby impede the
capacity of big data research to yield insights into human biology
and behavior.
Below, this Essay provides a set of objectives and substantive
components to consider as part of a new ethical framework
guided by these values. In describing each objective of the
proposed framework, this discussion also sketches example ways
in which they could be met, through changes to regulations, the
policies of review boards, and guidance on research community
norms and industry best practices.

41. See European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital
Ethics: Data, Dignity and Technology, Opinion 4/2015 (Sept. 11, 2015) (“In
today’s digital environment, adherence to the law is not enough; we have to
consider the ethical dimension of data processing.”).
42. For a discussion of the human right to science and its application to the
regulation of citizen science, see Effy Vayena & John Tasioulas, “We the
Scientists:” A Human Right to Citizen Science, 28 PHIL. & TECH. 479 (2015).
43. Corporations are increasingly being called on to protect and respect
human rights, see UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, GUIDING PRINCIPLES
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT,
RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK 32–33 (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf,
including
rights related to scientific progress.
44. See id. at 20 (“Because human rights situations are dynamic,
assessments of human rights impacts should be undertaken at regular
intervals: prior to a new activity or relationship; prior to major decisions or
changes in the operation . . .; in response to or anticipation of changes in the
operating environment.”)
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A. Universal Coverage

Oversight should aim to cover the full scope of human
subjects research. Changes to the existing framework are needed
to address gaps in coverage for research involving many
categories of information deemed to be public or non-identifiable,
research that is privately funded, and research activities across
all stages of the lifecycle, including the storage, processing,
analysis, release, and post-release stages.45 Encouraging the use
of a wider range of privacy and security controls and moving
towards the model adopted by several European countries, in
which regulations cover all research activities regardless of the
institution or source of funding,46 are potential ways to address
this gap.
To reduce the burden on IRBs as a result of an expanded
scope of coverage, some responsibilities could be shared with
emerging review bodies, such as consumer review boards,47
participant-led review boards,48 and personal data cooperatives.49
For research subject to IRB review, regulators should consider
adopting new exemptions to full review that are based in part on
the risk-benefit determination described below, as well as explore
emerging technological solutions for automating review decisions.
In addition, changes to the Common Rule could direct IRBs to
implement a limited review process for all research at the
proposal stage, followed by regular monitoring throughout the

45. For an example framework for systematically analyzing privacy risks
and intended data uses and aligning them with appropriate interventions at
each stage of the information lifecycle, see generally Micah Altman et al., supra
note 1.
46. See Council Directive 2001/20/EC, 2001 O.J. (L. 121) 34,
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/eudralex/vol-1/dir_2001_20/dir_2001_20_en.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/UW8F-FQUQ.
47. See Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought
Experiment, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 97, 101–02 (2013) (exploring the potential
benefits of consumer subject review boards).
48. See Effy Vayena & John Tasioulas, Adapting Standards: Ethical
Oversight of Participant-Led Health Research, 10 PLOS MED. e1001402 (2013).
49. See Ernst Hafen, Donald Kossmann & Angela Brand, Health Data
Cooperatives—Citizen Empowerment, 53 METHODS INFO. MED. 82, 84 (2014); see
also Effy Vayena & Urs Gasser, Between Openness and Privacy in Genomics, 13
PLOS MED. e1001937 (2016).
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research lifecycle to identify research activities for which
additional review is needed.
B. Conceptual Clarity
Revised definitions and standards for privacy protection, as
well as guidance on interpreting these definitions and applying
appropriate safeguards, would likely help IRBs and investigators
provide adequate and consistent protection for human subjects.
As discussed above, the Common Rule’s definition of human
subjects research, particularly its reliance on a sharp binary
determination based on the presence of “identifiable private
information,” leads to inconsistency and uncertainty in practice.50
To provide clarity, the regulations should establish definitions for
terms such as privacy, confidentiality, security, and sensitivity,
and the terminology should be used consistently.51
Changes to the Common Rule could include language
directing investigators to implement a combination of both
security and privacy controls, where security controls can be
viewed as restricting access to information, and privacy controls
as limiting the potential for harm once access to information is
granted. The regulations could also be revised to incorporate
definitions based on a modern understanding of privacy that is
not based on a strict binary conception of identifiability or public
availability. For instance, the notion of privacy risk should cover
more broadly the potential for others to learn about individuals
based on the inclusion of their information in a set of data, as
well as establish a privacy goal against which a technique for
privacy protection can be evaluated.52
Regulators and review boards should consider consulting
with ethics and privacy experts or establishing a regularlyconvening
advisory
committee
to
provide
concrete
50. For a more extensive discussion of the weaknesses of the Common
Rule’s binary identifiability standard, see Alexandra Wood et al., supra note 1,
at 16.
51. For example definitions for these terms, see Micah Altman et al., supra
note 1, at *30–31; Alexandra Wood et al., supra note 1, at 5–6.
52. See Alexandra Wood et al., supra note 1, at 5 (setting forth this
proposal).
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recommendations, as they formulate clarifying definitions,
practices, methodologies, and guidelines for implementing up-todate privacy practices. In particular, this expert body could help
develop detailed guidance for review boards to reference as they
incorporate revised concepts into their processes and the
materials provided to researchers and research subjects.
Regulators should also consider establishing a clearinghouse of
review board policies and decisions that would enable the
administrators of such bodies to learn from one another and
achieve greater consistency in the application of standards for
human subjects protection.
C. Risk-Benefit Assessments
Researchers and review boards should be encouraged to
incorporate
systematic
risk-benefit
assessments.53
Such
assessments should evaluate the benefits that would accrue to
society as a result of a research activity, the intended uses of the
data involved, the privacy threats and vulnerabilities associated
with the research activity, and the potential harms to human
subjects as a result of the inclusion of their information in the
data.54 Results from this assessment can be used to guide the
selection of protections that are calibrated to the specific risks
and uses associated with a given research activity.55
Regulators, in consultation with data privacy experts, should
consider developing detailed guidance to help review boards and
researchers systematically examine the privacy threats and
vulnerabilities at each stage of the information lifecycle, drawing
from concepts found in the technical literature on data privacy
53. For an introduction to the components of such a risk-benefit
assessment model, see the framework for a modern privacy analysis proposed in
Micah Altman et al., supra note 1, at *29–57, and the reference guide for
conducting benefit-risk analyses provided in Jules Polonetsky, Omer Tene &
Joseph Jerome, Benefit-Risk Analysis for Big Data Projects, FUTURE OF PRIVACY
FORUM,
at
7–8
(Sept.
2014),
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/
FPF_DataBenefitAnalysis_FINAL.pdf.
54. See Micah Altman et al., supra note 1, at *30–49 (outlining how to
characterize and assess such risks and benefits).
55. See id. at *51–57 (proposing a framework for designing data releases
“by aligning use, threats, and vulnerabilities with controls”).
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and information security.56 An expert body could, for example, be
involved in the development of guidance on modeling the risks
and uses associated with a research activity, and selecting
privacy controls that are aligned with these factors. Review
boards could, in turn, use this general guidance as a basis for
developing more detailed materials specific to their institutional
contexts. As the nature of the benefits and risks changes over
time, assessments should also evolve, and therefore regulators
should consider consulting regularly with an expert body to
update the guidance materials that are produced.
D. New Procedural and Technological Solutions
Researchers should be incentivized to select from the wide
range of procedural, economic, legal, educational, and technical
protections that are available, rather than to rely on a narrow
subset of controls, such as consent and de-identification.57
Adoption of techniques from the full scope of available controls
could be encouraged through revisions to the Common Rule
requiring researchers to consider implementing reasonable and
appropriate procedural, economic, legal, educational, or technical
safeguards at each stage of the information lifecycle. In addition,
regulatory language referring to consent and de-identification
could be amended to acknowledge that in many cases these
measures should be used in conjunction with additional controls,
including information security controls.
Regulators should also consider creating a safe harbor for
researchers who use robust privacy-preserving techniques.58
Regulators, in consultation with an expert body of privacy
researchers, IRB administrators, and researchers, could be
authorized to compile a list of approved techniques that provide a
strong guarantee of privacy protection. Examples of some of the
technological controls that should be considered for inclusion in
56. For a framework for analyzing informational harms throughout the
information lifecycle, see id. at *45–51.
57. For an expansive catalog of the privacy and security controls that
researchers should be encouraged to consider adopting, see id. at 34–45.
58. For a proposal outlining a Common Rule safe harbor for certain
privacy-preserving techniques, see Salil Vadhan et al., supra note 1, at 7–8.
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such a list include privacy-aware methods for contingency tables,
synthetic data, data visualizations, interactive mechanisms, and
multiparty computations.59 Revisions to the regulations could
also require regulators and experts to meet regularly to update
the list of approved techniques to reflect technological advances.
Revised guidance materials could also cover new approaches to
established controls such as consent, including methods for
standardizing privacy policies for ease of understanding60 and
processes for dynamic consent that enable individuals to grant,
modify, and revoke fine-grained research permissions over time.61
E. Tailored Oversight
No one-size-fits-all solution to privacy exists, and researchers
should instead be encouraged to adopt procedures and safeguards
that are calibrated to the intended uses of the information
collected; the benefits of the research activity; and the threats,
vulnerabilities, and harms associated with the activity. One way
to tailor oversight is to subject different categories of research
activities to oversight by different review boards, including IRBs,
consumer review boards, participant-led review boards, or
personal data cooperatives. For example, in cases where IRB
review is not required by the Common Rule, seeking approval
from an appropriate review board could be required by journal
editors or institutional policies and recommended more generally
as an industry or research community best practice.
Oversight can also be tailored at the data sharing stage
through tiered access.62 Tiered access enables a data provider to
59. See id. at 4 (listing and defining these examples of privacy-preserving
techniques).
60. See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Necessary But Not Sufficient: Standardized
Mechanisms for Privacy Notice and Choice, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
273, 287–88, 305–06 (2012) (examining efforts to create standardized privacy
notices and setting forth the benefits of standardization).
61. See Jane Kaye et al., Dynamic Consent: A Patient Interface for TwentyFirst Century Research Networks, 23 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 141, 143 (2014)
(explaining how dynamic consent platforms can be tailored to consumers’
privacy preferences).
62. For a discussion of tiered access mechanisms and examples illustrating
how they can be designed, see generally Salil Vadhan et al., supra note 1;
Alexandra Wood et al., supra note 1; Micah Altman et al., supra note 1.
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match the data-sharing mechanism with the risks of sharing such
data, including factors related to the structure of the data, the
sensitivity of the information and potential harms of disclosure,
the level of consent obtained from subjects, the credentials of the
intended recipients of the data, and the types of analyses they
intend to perform.63 For example, sharing aggregate data using
one of the privacy-aware methods described above, such as
statistics in the form of contingency tables generated using
methods providing a formal guarantee of privacy, could be
deemed a suitable option for making data available to the public.
An intermediate level could allow approved researchers with
proper credentials to analyze the data through a protected server
after agreeing to the terms of a data use agreement, providing the
data subjects with additional legal protections from misuse. For
full access to raw data, individuals, such as academic researchers,
could apply for access to the data through a monitored data
environment, such as a virtual data enclave, under the terms of a
data use agreement.
Similar mechanisms for aligning safeguards with intended
uses can be implemented at other stages in the research lifecycle.
For example, data minimization and purpose specification
principles, operationalized through computable policies, could be
applied at the study design and data collection stages to ensure
that only the minimum amount of information is collected from
human subjects and that data uses are restricted to those
authorized by the subjects. Regulators, in consultation with data
privacy experts, could establish guidance on tailoring controls at
each stage of the lifecycle and implementing a tiered access
mechanism. Additionally, review boards could be empowered to
supplement this guidance with detailed instructions specific to
their institutional contexts.
VI. Multistakeholder Process for the Development of a Framework
Development of a new ethical framework with these
components should be the product of a multistakeholder process,
63. For an example of a systematic framework for matching privacy
interventions to the threats, harms, and vulnerabilities in a specific data release
case, see Micah Altman et al., supra note 1, at *29–57.
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with involvement from researchers, institutional review board
administrators, industry representatives, regulators, ethicists,
journal editors, and research subjects.64 In addition to established
principles of human subjects research protection, this
multistakeholder group should be guided by the human right to
science,65 which includes the right to participate in the production
of scientific knowledge, and seek to harmonize the latter right
with other interests, such as the right to privacy. One output this
group could consider developing is a set of ethical norms based in
part on existing best practices for research ethics. A panel of
domain experts from fields such as computer science, information
security, law, and ethics could be convened to develop
recommendations regarding practices, methodologies, and tools
that are appropriate in different contexts, which could in turn
inform the multistakeholder group’s assessment of existing best
practices. The set of norms developed by the group might begin as
general guidelines but evolve over time into more formal codes of
practice.
Interfacing with existing ethics and IRB processes, as well as
with emerging oversight processes, such as consumer review
boards, participant-led review boards,66 and personal data
cooperatives, would likely be a key component of this process.
Regulators and institutional review board administrators, as
stakeholders in this process, could evaluate the extent to which
the current regulatory system is compatible with big data
research, or whether changes to the Common Rule would be
64. For a discussion of a proposal to convene a multistakeholder group to
develop ethical guidelines for big data research, see generally Effy Vayena &
Urs Gasser, Strictly Biomedical? Sketching the Ethics of the Big Data Ecosystem
in Biomedicine, in ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL BIG DATA (Brent Mittelstadt &
Luciano Floridi eds., forthcoming 2016).
65. See Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural
Rights), Report on the Copyright Policy & the Right to Science & Culture, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/28/57, at 4–5 (Dec. 24, 2014); Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur
in the Field of Cultural Rights), Report on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of
Scientific Progress and Its Applications, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/26, at 3 (May 14,
2012); U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Seminar on
the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/26/19, at 5 (April 1, 2014).
66. See Effy Vayena et al., Research Led by Participants: A New Social
Contract for a New Kind of Research, J. MED. ETHICS, at 1 (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2015/03/30/medethics-2015-102663.full.pdf.

ELEMENTS OF A NEW ETHICAL FRAMEWORK

441

required. The multistakeholder group could also assess whether
institutional review boards are appropriate as the primary
oversight body for big data research. Alternatively, it may find
that technological solutions can help automate some decisions
traditionally made by IRBs, or that oversight by consumer review
boards, participant-led review boards, or personal data
cooperatives are better suited to the oversight of big data
research.
Researchers should also be involved in the formulation of the
framework, in recognition of the human right to participation in
science across the entire lifecycle of research. Researcher input
would likely help ensure that the oversight framework does not
create new inefficiencies or burdens on the research process.
Finally, the multistakeholder group would likely benefit from
regular meetings to review and update the framework once it is
in place, to ensure its flexibility and adaptability to unforeseen
technological advancements, emerging study design and
analytical techniques, new research questions, evolving privacy
and other risks to human subjects, regulatory shifts, and changes
in societal expectations of privacy.

VII. Conclusions
This Essay has described several essential elements for the
development of a new ethical framework for big data research. A
framework that is well-suited to the distinct and evolving
features of big data research will achieve more appropriate
privacy protection, enable greater harmonization of oversight
across types of big data research, and facilitate the conduct of
ethical research. Such a framework can catalyze big data
utilization and help harness the tremendous value of big data in
a sustainable and trust-building manner.

